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Research from a Fulbright Police Fellowship conducted in
summer 2001 studying US attitudes and policies to inter-
national law enforcement cooperation is presented. Differences
between UK police and the multitude of US federal agencies in
approaches to investigating transnational organised crime are
identified, along with the implications for conducting evidence-
gathering abroad and joint operations. No one approach is either
right or wrong: the key to successful investigations lies in
accommodating, rather than bemoaning, political and cultural
differences in attitudes to law enforcement. This article alerts
investigators to some of the issues they may encounter in
transatlantic cooperation. Although researched and largely
written prior to 1 1 September 2001, the aftermath of those
events has not materially affected the conclusions drawn here.
Positive attitudes to cooperation have been promoted, but some
differences in approach have also been enhanced.
Introduction
At the start of the twenty-first century it is a rhetorical truism that
the world is becoming 'smaller' through 'globalisation', and that
this is true of criminal activity as much as it is true of lawful
interaction (Buckley, 1998; Fiorentini & Peltzman, 1997). Con-
sequently contact between UK police agencies and their foreign
counterparts has increased as both individual investigations and
systemic criminality more frequently assume transnational pro-
portions. The geographical focus of this increased contact lies
within the EU. Between 1997 and 1999 65.6% of formal mutual
legal assistance requests to foreign judicial or investigative
authorities made via the United Kingdom Central Authority
(UKCA) were to EU member-states; 6.9% were to the United
States (Home Office, 2000b). What these figures do not capture
is the extent of informal contact between UK investigators and
foreign agencies. The UK focus will always primarily be with its
European neighbours and there are a great many Justice and
Home Affairs (JHA) initiatives being promoted in the EU (for
instance, Europol, Eurojust, the European Judicial Network and
the European Police College). US participation in EU initiatives
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is limited both by EU community law and US foreign policy. By
force of circumstance, UK authorities are acquiring greater
familiarity with and understanding of their European neighbours.
With the US such understanding is often assumed because of
perceived cultural ties, the so-called 'special relationship',1 lin-
guistic similarities and a superficial familiarity born of media
entertainment such as Hill Street Blues and The X Files. In fact,
the US criminal justice system differs significantly from that in
the UK and in some respects the role of the prosecutor, for
instance, bears closer resemblance to models extant in con-
tinental Europe. JHA assistance within Europe has already
achieved a greater level of sophistication than will ever be
possible in transatlantic cooperation. Recognising such limita-
tions reduces the frustration inherent in transnational, and in
particular transatlantic, cooperation.
The present author was awarded a Fulbright Police Fellow-
ship2 in May 2000 which was undertaken as personal research in
Washington DC between May and August 2001. This article
highlights key issues identified during that research in order to
alert UK investigators to the context within which US authorities
operate4: issues that may influence the way in which US author-
ities respond to UK requests, and the way in which requests from
US authorities are made to the UK (which between 1997 and
1999 accounted for just 2.18% of formal requests received via
the UKCA, whereas EU partners generated 80.83% of such
requests; see Home Office, 2000a).
Types of Assistance
Practical investigative assistance between law enforcement agen-
cies in different nations may be categorised simply into informal
and formal.5 Informal assistance, often colloquially referred to as
cop-to-cop, describes all forms of assistance for which no form
of compulsion or court process is required. Typically it involves
the sharing of information, and as such may be controlled by
data protection legislation. Different standards in data protection
are currently a source of friction between policy makers on either
side of the Atlantic since the EU has set standards in data
protection that it may be impossible for the US ever to attain
(with consequent constraints on what can be shared with US
authorities).6
The extent to which informal assistance can be a vehicle by
which evidence for use in court is secured depends upon court
procedures in the requesting state and domestic law in the
requested state. There are few barriers to a witness voluntarily
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making a statement, particularly if the witness, for instance, is a
UK national resident in the US and it is UK investigators who
are seeking evidence for use in the UK (interviews, Sussex
Police CID, Brighton, 20 July 1999; 3 August 1999). There may
be no objection on the part of US authorities to UK officers
attending the US to take such a statement but at the very least the
UK officer so deployed will require a work visa prior to arriving
in the US and should seek permission from the US authorities to
take the statement (interviews, FBI Legal Attach6, US Embassy,
London, 22 February 2001; 22 March 2001). Officers investigat-
ing without permission or a work visa are liable to immediate
deportation.
Informal assistance is often a precursor to formal assistance:
a means by which investigators explore whether or not evidence
is available before requesting it formally. A formal request will
always be necessary where any element of compulsion to pro-
vide evidence is required, for instance the subpoena of a witness
or the warranted search and seizure of physical evidence.
Aside from practical investigative assistance there also exists
policymaking assistance in what have been described as 'quasi-
secret international fora' (Statewatch, 2001: 18). Such assistance
takes place in multinational working groups such as those
established under the auspices of the G8 Lyon Group (Sussman,
1999: 482; Godson & Williams, 2001: 333-4), in which inves-
tigators agree common positions to adopt when consulting with
law makers. The G8 cyber crime '24/7 single points of contact'
scheme, an initiative arising from such a working group, is an
attempt to formalise an informal network of precursor or prepar-
atory liaison. Even so, some US agencies will continue to prefer
their own personal contacts to the quasi-official 24/7 scheme
(interview, US Customs, Fairfax, Virginia, 3 June 2001).
Instruments of Assistance
Formal assistance, as the term implies, is based on legal instru-
ments such as domestic laws and international treaties.7 Both the
UK and the US have domestic laws that permit the provision of
assistance to foreign authorities (Criminal Justice (International
Co-operation) Act 1990, Part I; Title 28 US Code, Section 1782).
In the UK, the CJ(IC)A allows for the provision of assistance
regardless of reciprocity, regardless of whether a mutual legal
assistance treaty is extant, and in all but search and seizure
provisions and some fiscal offences, regardless of dual criminal-
ity. The common principle is that assistance should be provided
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in a manner consistent with the domestic laws of the requested
state.
This principle finds expression in international legal instru-
ments that can be categorised into bilateral mutual legal assis-
tance treaties (MLATs) and multilateral conventions. The terms
'treaty' and 'convention' are synonymous in international law
(Shaw, 1997: 73-4) but in this article they are used as a
convenience to distinguish between bilateral agreements and
multilateral agreements respectively. (Some extradition and tax
treaties also provide formal mechanisms for evidence gathering
and other investigative assistance.)
There is a very strong US political and foreign policy
preference for bilateral MLATs (interview, US Government,
Department of Justice, Washington DC, 16 May 2001; see also
text of speech given in Japan in 1998 by John Harris, Director of
the Office of International Affairs (OIA), US Department of
Justice). The US has now negotiated bilateral MLATs with over
40 nations, including the UK. For US authorities, the advantage
of bilateral MLATs lies in the legally binding obligations created
between two nations. Multilateral conventions, such as the 1959
Council of Europe Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters or the 2000 UN Convention against Transnational Orga-
nised Crime (UNCTOC), create common standards but without
any element of compulsion.
The further advantage perceived by US authorities is the
ability to tailor individual MLATs to particular international
circumstances (US Department of Justice Resource Manual,
Paragraph 276),8 which arrangement usually benefits the US
(even to the extent of negotiating non-reciprocal obligations in
their favour; Gilmore, 1995: xxi). Bilateral partners can also use
this to their advantage. A unique feature in the UK-US MLAT,
for instance, is the obligation imposed upon the US to use the
MLAT as a means of first resort before using other, unilateral
methods to obtain evidence (Article 18(2)). 9 Such a clause is a
consequence of the diplomatic argument caused when US
authorities sought to compel the production of evidence from the
UK Cayman Islands in a manner that would have resulted in a
criminal violation of Cayman law (Gilmore, 1995: xxiii).
Multilateral conventions, which usually contain agreements
to harmonise criminal liabilities (see Article 3 UN Convention
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Sub-
stances (1988); articles 3 and 4 of the UNCTOC) often have
provision for mutual legal assistance measures. For instance
Article 14 UNCTOC provides for the taking of statements, the
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service of judicial documents, and search and seizure. In the
absence of a bilateral MLAT (which will always supersede a
multilateral convention as far as the US authorities are con-
cerned), measures contained in a multilateral convention can
provide a fall-back position (interview, FBI Legal Attach6, US
Embassy, London, 22 February 2001). On 25 May 2001 the US
ratified the Organisation of American States Inter-American
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (IACMA)
and its related Protocol. In his Letter of Transmittal inviting
Congress to support ratification, President Clinton went further
than to argue that the IACMA was just a fall-back position,
suggesting that it was preferable to trying to secure a bilateral
treaty in some cases. He asserted that the 'Convention and
Protocol would obviate the expenditure of resources that would
be required for the United States to negotiate and bring into force
bilateral mutual assistance treaties with certain OAS member
states'. 10 It is not always an option the US wishes to adopt. The
US has, for instance, declined an invitation to accede to the 1959
Council of Europe Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters as a Third Party even though accession would create
conventional relationships with European countries with which
the US has no treaty relationship (interview, US Government
Department of Justice, Washington DC, 16 May 2001). The US
perspective is that such conventions achieve only the lowest
common denominator of agreement and that nothing of sub-
stance can be agreed to in such arrangements (McDonald, 2000;
interview, Department of Justice, Washington DC, 16 May
2001).
Grounds for Refusal
MLATs and conventions contain grounds for refusing a request
(see Article 21, UNCTOC). The UK-US MLAT is no exception
(Article 3).
Occasionally there is a requirement for dual criminality. In
such circumstances assistance will only be provided if the
criminal behaviour being investigated by the requesting state is
also subject to criminal liability in the requested state. Wherever
possible, the provision of assistance without a requirement for
dual criminality is encouraged in the international legal commu-
nity. Dual criminality is sometimes required only for specific
types of assistance within a catalogue of measures contained
within either a treaty or a convention. Domestic law sometimes
requires dual criminality. The UK, for instance, will only execute
requests for search and seizure in circumstances where the crime
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being investigated by the requesting authority would constitute a
serious arrestable offence in the UK (CJ(IC)A s.7(1)).
Requests must also be in compliance with the domestic law
of the requested state, and here there is particular tension
between the US and the UK in respect of search and seizure,
provision for which is made in the UK-US MLAT (Article 14).
US citizens are protected by the US Constitution the fourth
amendment to which states: 'The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.' The key phrase in this
eighteenth-century assertion is 'probable cause'. Miles of law
library shelves creak under the weight of accumulated learned
tomes from the last two hundred years seeking to interpret what
the framers of the US Constitution meant by this document.
Nowhere is 'probable cause' defined. Rather, probable cause is a
continuum of interpretation within a wider continuum (Shapiro,
1991: 143; see also Klotter, 1999: 90-91).
Individual judges determine whether or not there is sufficient
probable cause to issue a search warrant. It is universally
accepted within the US criminal justice system that the standard
of probable cause to be met for a search warrant is more rigorous
than the standard to be met when arresting a suspect, or when
searching a suspect on the street. Such is the probable cause
continuum. The wider continuum expresses the range of stan-
dards facing law enforcement agencies from reasonable belief,
through reasonable suspicion and so on to probable cause
(Shapiro, 1991).
This is not the place to debate the relative equivalence of the
probable cause necessary in the US for a judge to issue a search
warrant and the reasonable suspicion required under the Police
and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) for a UK judge to issue a
search warrant; suffice it to say that US authorities assert that US
probable cause offers a higher standard and better quality of
justice than does UK reasonable suspicion. OIA lawyers inter-
viewed for this research could not themselves recall a UK
request for the execution of a search warrant in the US ever
being granted, and do not necessarily expect to grant such a
request because the 'higher standards of justice' in their domes-
tic law give them grounds for refusal to what otherwise has been
agreed in the MLAT (interview, OIA, US Government Dept of
Justice, Washington DC, 22 June 2001). 11 Special Procedure
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Material, on the other hand, for which PACE reserves protec-
tions above and beyond those necessary for an ordinary search
warrant, can be compulsorily produced in the US upon the
issuance of a subpoena by a US prosecutor.
The US Constitution is the essence of American being. It is
sacrosanct (interview, ex-senior State Department official, Wash-
ington DC, 1 June 2001). The US has, from time to time, insisted
that other countries change their own written constitutions to
allow investigative techniques previously prohibited, to be
admitted within the amended constitution and so facilitate US
requests for formal mutual legal assistance, compliance often
being achieved through powerful economic persuasion (Carlson
& Zagaris, 1991). To all the interviewees asked, it was incon-
ceivable that the US should ever return such flexibility of
approach to accommodate foreign law enforcement requests
(interview, former senior State Department and Clinton Admin-
istration expert on transnational organised crime, Washington
DC, 1 June 2001).12 There is little point in taking umbrage at the
consequences foisted upon other nations since that will not
achieve anything. Rather, investigation strategies and policies
must take account of such a position.
Lawyers and federal agents are not slow to suggest a way
around such an impasse. US judges, whose careers are dependent
upon them not upsetting those who elect or appoint them,
historically are more sympathetic to requests for compulsory
process made by US agencies than those made on behalf of a
foreign agency. If an American nexus to the investigation can be
established, thus initiating a parallel domestic investigation in
the US, evidence can be sought for the US investigation and then
shared with a foreign authority. A US agency has a far better
chance of persuading a judge that there is sufficient probable
cause than does a foreign agency (interview, FBI, Washington
DC, 3 July 2001; interview, Florida State Prosecutor, Wash-
ington DC, 29 June 2001).
Tempting though this approach may be, it is not without its
own possible consequences. The fact that a domestic investiga-
tion concerning the same suspect or evidence is in progress may
provide a possible further ground for refusal in the UK-US
MLAT (Article 5(4)) which provides for the postponement
(perhaps indefinitely) of a request execution pending the out-
come of ongoing US investigations and court proceedings. Here
the domestic dynamics within which US law enforcement agen-
cies operate are engaged and these will be discussed below. The
UK investigator must consider whether a parallel US investiga-
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tion may ultimately compromise or frustrate the UK investiga-
tion before opting for this way round the 'probable cause' issue.
That is not to say that US authorities automatically would refuse
assistance in such circumstances, but none of the interviewees to
whom the question was posed would say that such an outcome
was unlikely.
The Request Process
The UK-US MLAT dictates that each country must establish a
'Central Authority' and that a request for formal mutual legal
assistance from the UK to the US (and vice versa) can only be
made via the Central Authority in each nation (Article 2). The
central authority in the UK is the UKCA based at the Home
Office, London, and for the US it is the Office of International
Affairs (OIA) based at the Department of Justice, Washington
DC.
In the UK there are over 50 police forces.13 In the US there
49 federal agencies at least some of whose staff are entitled to
make arrests and to bear arms (Geller & Morris, 1992; Bureau of
Justice Statistics, 1996). The numbers of local law enforcement
agencies are so numerous that there appear to be no definitive
figures for just how many agencies exist but the best estimate of
the Interpol National Central Bureau in Washington DC is that
there are approximately 18,500 police forces at state, county and
local municipality level (interview, Interpol USNCB, Wash-
ington DC, 23 May 2001). Thus funnelling request traffic
through the central authorities resolves for the requesting state
the vexed issue of to whom to address the request. The OIA,
staffed with several teams of lawyers, each team having a
regional responsibility for liaison with different parts of the
globe, reviews both incoming and outgoing requests for legality
and legitimacy. Incoming requests to the US are frequently
deemed to be insufficient and are returned for further informa-
tion, although while this is being done it is often possible for the
US authorities to set matters in motion ready for when the
paperwork is completed to their satisfaction (interview, OIA, US
Department of Justice, Washington DC, 16 May 2001).
The OIA will then identify in which of the 94 Federal
Districts the request needs to be executed.14 The request is
passed to the US Attorney for that Federal District and allocated
to an Assistant US Attorney (AUSA) who will present the matter
at court requesting the issuing of the compulsory process.
Depending upon the nature of the request, the court will appoint
the AUSA as its Commissioner to ensure the execution of the
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request. The AUSA can then issue any necessary subpoenas and
will approach the local field office of the appropriate federal
agency in the event that a request require investigative assistance
such as locating a witness (Resource Manual, paragraph 286).
The product of the request is then returned via the OIA, although
the federal agents may well contact the original requesting
officer with an update to short-cut the official response.
Operation Cathedral, the investigation of a global paedophile
network utilising the Internet coordinated by the National Crime
Squad, resulted in the simultaneous execution of numerous
search warrants in 12 different countries, one of which was the
US. In the US, 32 warrants were to be executed in 22 Federal
Districts. Whilst all these districts adhered to the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, some districts additionally had their own
interpretative rules of procedure supplementing the Federal
Rules. There was local variation, for instance, on the times at
which search warrants could be executed. It was, in fact, more
difficult for the US authorities to coordinate the simultaneous
execution of these 32 warrants in 22 districts than it was for the
National Crime Squad to coordinate simultaneous enforcement
action in the remaining 11 nations (interview, US Dept of
Justice, Washington DC, 19 June 2001). Foreign officers making
requests do not always appreciate such local issues.
The Role of the Federal Agencies
By and large, the execution of mutual legal assistance requests in
the US is undertaken by one of the federal agencies. Law
enforcement in the US is primarily the responsibility of State and
local authorities but federal intervention is permitted where the
circumstances implicate interstate commerce or crimes against
the United States. By definition, an international request thus
invites federal intervention. In the UK all police forces have the
same powers and responsibilities and so the discriminating factor
in determining to which force the UKCA will pass a US request
is one of geography. In the US all federal agencies have national
territorial responsibility and some additionally claim extra-
territorial responsibilities. Thus the discriminating factor
becomes functional jurisdiction. In many crimes there may well
be concurrent jurisdiction between different agencies. It will be a
matter for the AUSA which federal agency is engaged in the
request, if that issue has not already been influenced through
precursor contact and informal assistance. Having doubled in
size since the appointment of Louis Freeh as its Director, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) often assists in foreign
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requests because it has the staff available to do so, but much of
its work is concurrent with the Drugs Enforcement Agency
(DEA) and the US Secret Service (USSS).15 Other agencies that
may become involved include the Immigration and Nationalisa-
tion Service (INS), US Customs and the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms (ATF).
Most of these agencies have liaison officers posted to the US
Embassy in London. Informal assistance can be provided by
these liaison officers and legal attachrs and they are on hand to
advise on such matters, as is a representative of the OIA, also
posted to the London embassy. In any given investigation, more
than one federal agency may be willing, and may have the
jurisdiction, to assist.
The motivation to assist may not be based merely on comity
however. Federal agencies seek appropriation of funding from
Congress. Funding is linked to success and utility. In the US
transnational organised crime is viewed as an external threat
(Geary, 2000) and therefore a national security issue. In Presi-
dential Decision Directive 42, dated 21 October 1995, President
Clinton determined that 'international organised criminal enter-
prises ... are not only a law enforcement problem, they are a
threat to national security'.16 In Executive Order 12,978, effec-
tive the same day, he declared a 'national emergency to deal with
that threat' (USCCAN B 106, 21 October 1995). Federal agencies
were directed to take 'all appropriate actions within their author-
ity to carry out this order' (ibid). Whilst recognising an 'obliga-
tion to others', the primary and overriding purpose of the
Directive and the Executive Order was 'to protect the welfare,
safety and security of the United States and its citizens' (PDD
42). Some commentators argued even before PDD 42 that US
law enforcement agencies were fully fledged members of the
national security apparatus (Kupperman, 1994: 132-3): others
maintain that transnational organised crime is not a national
security issue (Treverton, 1999).17
National security work attracts increased funding, thus there
is a considerable financial incentive for federal agencies to
become involved in international law enforcement that can be
seen to be defending the national security of the US. The focus
on national security demands that international law enforcement
cooperation engaged in by US federal agencies should, prima-
rily, deliver prisoners for federal agencies and convictions in US
courts. There is no financial incentive or reward for engaging in
cooperation that primarily, or wholly, assists foreign law
enforcement without some return for US effort expended.
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The considerable investment made by federal agencies in the
provision of training to non-US law enforcement personnel, in
such programmes as the International Law Enforcement Acad-
emies (ILEA) or the hosting of training courses for foreign law
enforcement agents in the US, is intended primarily to establish
personal contacts abroad for individual federal agencies for their
own international political agenda (see Goldstein, 1996). A
recent review of such training undertaken by the Government
Accounting Office (the investigative arm of Congress roughly
equivalent in function to the Audit Commission) concluded that
without a structured plan for delivery or a means of evaluating
the training provided, the millions of dollars invested in such
programmes is being wasted (General Accounting Office,
2001). 18 The federal agencies, rivalling each other for successful
foreign investigations, consider it money well spent because it
enables them to establish an international network of contacts
beholden to them who can then be called upon to assist in
investigations abroad that the US agency wishes to conduct. The
long-term goal of such projects is to lay foundations for the
further facilitation of future US foreign investigations. Ulti-
mately, successful foreign investigations mean money and polit-
ical influence for federal agencies.
US domestic law makes considerable provision for asset
forfeiture, and also allows the seized assets from criminals to
be shared with foreign agencies in cases where such agencies
have contributed to a conviction in the US courts. The value of
seized assets amounts to millions of dollars each year and some
state and local law enforcement agencies rely on such forfeiture
for the majority of their funding. Confiscation provides a sig-
nificant amount of funding for federal agencies (interview, FBI,
Washington DC, 3 July 2001). Investigations likely to lead to
forfeiture thus have an attraction not enjoyed by other inves-
tigations.
Such issues should not be viewed pejoratively. UK inves-
tigators need merely to be aware of the domestic political context
within which US federal agencies operate in order to appreciate
where confusions and frustrations may arise when the nuances of
the system are not fully understood. Such a context may influ-
ence the enthusiasm with which and the extent to which US
agencies assist UK investigations. Incentives, and disincentives,
also influence UK responses and investigative behaviour. One
US observer noted wryly how permission requests for UK
officers to visit the US on enquiries always seem to peak just
before Christmas each year (interview, Interpol USNCB, Wash-
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ington DC, 23 May 2001). And local policing priorities in the
UK do not take account of the ad hoc needs of foreign agencies.
Scrawled in the margin of one Commission Rogatoire, returned
to the UKCA with the request having been executed by an
English police force, was the note of a disgruntled Detective
Chief Inspector: 'I suppose we'll have to do this but it doesn't fit
with our service plan' (interview, UKCA, London, 7 August
1998).
UK experiences of assistance provided by US agencies will
vary from one part of the US to another. The research on which
this article is based was conducted entirely within 'the Beltway'
and must, by default, reflect 'Beltway views'. 19 In Florida liaison
with non-US law enforcement agencies is a daily occurrence: so,
too, for the law enforcement professionals in California's Silicon
Valley area. Interviews with Floridian state and federal prose-
cutors indicate that some attitudes evident in DC are not shared,
even within the same organisation, outside Washington (inter-
views, Washington DC, 21 June 2001; 29 June 2001; 25 July
2001) and elsewhere in the US there is little or no familiarity
with international law enforcement cooperation.
The Role of the Prosecutor
State and Federal prosecutors may play a greater role in inves-
tigation strategies than their UK counterparts in the Crown
Prosecution Service. 20 Even before specific crimes and suspects
have been identified, prosecutors may be involved in the plan-
ning stages of investigations. They may be appointed to direct
the activities of multi-agency task forces which second staff
from federal state and local agencies. Once appointed as Com-
missioners to oversee the execution of a foreign request, they are
empowered to issue subpoenas. There are also a great many
more of them: in some US Attorney's offices, AUSAs are
numbered in hundreds for a single federal district.
It is the prosecutor who controls how and when a foreign
request is executed in the US. One foreign liaison officer posted
to his country's embassy in Washington advises that establishing
a working relationship with the AUSA is the key to the success-
ful resolution of a request (interview, foreign liaison officer,
Washington DC, 3 June 2001). This will be difficult to do for a
UK-based officer. The advice of the FBI legal attach6 in London
is that UK investigators need to identify and liaise with the law
enforcement officer assigned by the AUSA to carry out the
request (interview, US Embassy London, 22 February 2001).
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Again, this may be difficult to achieve if there has been no
occasion to establish precursor informal contact.
The Role of Interpol
The USNCB is located within the Department of Justice, Wash-
ington DC. All the major federal agencies, be they Justice or
Treasury agencies, are represented in the USNCB. Any formal
requests erroneously directed to the USNCB will be referred for
resubmission to the OIA via the central authority (unless the
relevant MLAT provides for request transmission to OIA via
Interpol). The USNCB is well positioned to help establish
informal assistance contacts, particularly if there is no agency
representative available at the London embassy (interview, Inter-
pol USNCB counsel, Washington DC, 23 May 2001).
Human Rights and Constitutional Rights
The European concept of human rights is not shared in the US.
Despite its active participation in the American Commission for
Human Rights (in which it jointly adjudicates on allegations of
human rights abuses by other states), the US has refused to sign
or ratify the American Convention on Human Rights. Protection
from overbearing government action for the US citizen rather is
to be found in the US Constitution, drafted, as its preamble
asserts, to *establish justice' where previously none was found. It
is difficult to equate constitutional rights with human rights. It
seems possible, however, that action lawfully undertaken in the
US that does not violate the Constitution may nevertheless be
subject to a human rights challenge in a UK court. In the case of
Soering, the European Court of Human Rights held that the
extradition of Soering (a German national) from the UK to the
US to stand trial for capital murder, for which he was liable to be
executed upon conviction, would violate Article 3 of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights [ECHR] (11 EHRR 439
[1989]; also 28 ILM 1063 [1989]). This judgment effectively
established extra-territorial effect for the ECHR.
The extra-territorial effect of the US Constitution was tested
in Alvarez-Machain (504 US 655, 112 S Ct 2188, 119 L Ed 2d
441 1992). Alvarez-Machain was abducted in Mexico by agents
of the US Government and delivered across the US/Mexican
border. Once inside the US he was arrested. His property in
Mexico was searched without warrant by US federal agents.
These actions were challenged successfully as a violation of the
US Constitution at both the court of first instance and the appeal
court. The matter was referred to the US Supreme Court which
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overturned the rulings of the lower courts and adopted a very
narrow reading of the Constitution. It held, notwithstanding the
existence of an extradition treaty between the US and Mexico,
that the treaty mechanism was not an exclusive means for
rendering a suspect located in Mexico liable to US jurisdiction. It
was not concerned with the manner in which a suspect might be
so rendered, nor did it hold that the Fourth Amendment prohibi-
tion against unreasonable and unwarranted searches applied to
non-US citizens (Paust et al., 2000: 479-89; see also Lowenfeld,
1989a and b; Wedgewood, 1990 for other examples).
The effect of human rights legislation on international
mutual legal assistance is a complex area of law in which there
are contradictory judgments (Gane & Mackarel, 1996). As a rule
of thumb for interim guidance pending definitive case law, it
seems reasonable to suggest that any actions undertaken by US
authorities in the US on behalf of UK authorities, and in
fulfilment of a UK request for formal mutual legal assistance,
ought to accord with the Human Rights Act 1998 or else they
will be liable to challenge in a UK court either as a breach of
human rights or at least as unfair evidence to be excluded under
s.78 PACE.
Conclusion: Vive la Difference
Western Hemisphere and European attitudes to criminal justice
and law enforcement are influenced by geopolitical context.
America's relations with its immediate geographical neighbours
are very different from the UK's relations with its European
neighbours. There, crime is a domestic issue with increasingly
international aspects (Fijnaut, 1998). In the EU regional JHA
solutions are being developed and these dominate international
law enforcement cooperation within Europe (Joyce, 1999). In the
US, the perspective of transnational crime as an external threat to
national security (a perspective enshrined in policy since 1995)
drives a different approach in which the primary purpose of
international law enforcement cooperation is to secure foreign
assistance in protecting US borders from crime before it arrives
in the US (White House, 1998: 5).21 It is a perspective reinforced
by the events of 11 September 2001.
Across the world, cops have a common interest in catching
the bad guys. But exactly who constitutes a bad guy and how
best to catch him are issues that can differ markedly. There exist
a number of ad hoc structures, both legal instruments and
cooperative fora, that seek to facilitate international law enforce-
ment cooperation. There seems little prospect of ever achieving
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full consensus on how best to achieve such cooperation or any
consistency in the current structures, although legislative and
policy reactions to the 11 September attacks have given added
emphasis to the further synchronisation of cooperation mecha-
nisms (Statewatch, 2002: 1, 13-16). And accepting national
differences in politics and culture, this may not be a desirable
goal. Given that consistency within the current structures is not
imminent, to make existing mechanisms work at their optimum,
political and cultural differences must be understood and accom-
modated rather than resisted. Frustrations in international law
enforcement are inevitable but they can be minimised with the
realisation that, however familiar the foreign system may appear,
it will in fact be very different. In the case of UK/US coopera-
tion, the illusion of familiarity is particularly deceptive.
Endnotes
1 The UK-US relationship is not universally regarded as 'special'
and recent US press comment has been generally anti-European
(Washington Post, 22 June 2001, p.A24). 'For most countries in
Europe, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East, the most
important bilateral relationship each one has is the one with the
United States, and each of these relationships is, to put it bluntly,
more important to them than us' (Washington Times, 26 June 2001,
p.A19). 'However far Europe moves towards economic, political,
and military unity, the rivalries among its major component nations
- Britain, France and Germany - can never be totally laid to rest.
Washington will be able - and entitled - to play on these in its own
interests' (Washington Times 6 July 2001, p.A19).
2 Offered annually in open competition to staff from any UK police
force, two such Fellowships were awarded in 2000. In 2001 eight
were available and in 2002, 14 will be on offer: www.fulbright.
co.uk.
3 The research consisted of 60 interviews with 58 individuals as well
as library-based and Internet-based documentary research. Inter-
viewees included Congressional members from the House of
Representatives (equivalent to MPs), their staff, senior officials
from the government departments of State, Justice and the Treas-
ury (the first two of these being equivalent respectively to the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Home Office), inves-
tigators and lawyers from several federal agencies, state and
federal prosecutors, lawyers in private practice who previously
held senior positions in the Clinton Administration and academics.
(Some interviewees requested anonymity and for sake of con-
sistency this courtesy has been extended to all.) The author is
grateful to all these individuals for their participation and to staff at
the Library of Congress, the Congressional Research Service, and
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the libraries at Georgetown University for their assistance. The
author has been researching mutual legal assistance issues for a
number of years and research data from other projects has been
used in this article.
4 This article will confine itself to UK-US issues, since that relation-
ship is the focus of the Fulbright Award Scheme. It should be
recognised however, that relations with other Western Hemisphere
nations are equally important to European nations.
5 The Home Office tends to refer to informal assistance as 'mutual
assistance' and formal assistance as 'mutual legal assistance'.
6 These issues were debated at an EU-US conference held on 24
January 2001 in Ghent. Of particular relevance were papers pre-
sented by K. Lowrie (Acquisition and dissemination of law
enforcement information in the US) and P. Zanders (Strategies of
the EU and the US in combating transnational organised crime). At
time of writing, August 2001, it is understood that a collection of
papers from this conference is to be published.
7 Assistance may be provided simply on the basis of comity between
nations, in which case a diplomatic request will be made between
embassies. In the US, such a request is called a Letter Rogatory,
the translation of the term Commission Rogatoire, and is used
exclusively for non-treaty requests. In Europe the term Commission
Rogatoire describes any sort of formal mutual assistance request be
it pursuant to a treaty or simply a diplomatic request.
8 I am grateful to Stewart Robinson, Deputy Director, Office of
International Affairs, US Department of Justice, for allowing his
staff to provide me with relevant extracts from their Resource
Manual and the US Attorney's Manual. These extracts are held on
file with the author.
9 The text of the UK-US MLAT is archived at the Public Record
Office (FO 93/8/537) and is reproduced in Murray and Harris
(2000), Appendix Q.
10 Message from the President of the United States to Congress, 3
September 1997, 105th Congress, 1st Session, Treaty Doc. 105-25.
I am grateful to the Office of International Affairs, Department of
Justice, Washington DC, for providing me with a copy of the
IACMA text. www.oas.org/jurisdico/english/sigs/a-55.html indi-
cates that the US ratified the treaty on 25 may 2001 and that it
came into force for the US on 25 June 2001. Only two other OAS
states have so far ratified it.
11 That is not to say that there have never been such requests granted,
just that the four lawyers available for interview at the time of this
research could neither recall nor envisage a successful application.
12 As one liaison officer posted to a foreign embassy in Washington
observed, for his country economic sanctions were not a viable
option in trying to secure assistance from US authorities (inter-
view, foreign law enforcement liaison officer, Washington DC, 12
June 2001).
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13 Police forces are not the sole recipients of mutual legal assistance
requests. HM Customs & Excise receive a great many but it is
equally possible that simple requests for driver details, for instance,
would be passed from the UKCA to the DVLA for response.
14 The US federal court system is divided into 94 districts. Often
these are contiguous with State boundaries but in States with high
population there will be more than one federal court district. For
each federal district the President appoints one US Attorney in
charge of prosecutions. Any given UK investigation may involve
enquiries in more than one federal district. The federal appellate
courts are divided into 11 circuits.
15 The USSS, a Treasury federal agency, has responsibility for
investigating fraud and financial crimes as well as its more pub-
licised role of protecting the President. The FBI, DEA, INS and
USMS are federal agencies of the Justice Department. The USSS,
the ATF, and US Customs are federal agencies of the Treasury
Department. US Customs and US Marshals are the oldest agencies,
both established in 1789.
16 I am grateful to the National Security Council Information Office
for supplying me with a copy of this now declassified US Govern-
ment document.
17 President Clinton's declaration of national emergency has never
been rescinded. The debate about whether or not transnational
organised crime constitutes a national security threat depends
partly upon what is considered vital to the national security.
National security protection requires tools very different from
routine law enforcement: witness the heated Parliamentary debates
about emergency legislation following the terrorist attacks against
the continental US on 11 September 2001 (see for instance,
Parliamentary report, The Independent, 21 November 2001). Com-
bating transnational organised crime (usually a form of economic
trading in illicit commodities and services) does not necessarily
warrant the sorts of strong coercive powers considered necessary
for national security protection against terrorist acts.
18 Other GAO reports note the rivalry and lack of cooperation
between US federal agencies (1995; 1997).
19 The Beltway is the orbital interstate network circumnavigating
Washington DC. It is the DC equivalent of the M25. 'Beltway
views', a colloquial expression much used in DC, Maryland and
Virginia, are those of Washingtonians, federal agency HQs and
federal government. They might roughly equate with the 'chatter-
ing classes' of Islington.
20 In Florida, state prosecutors may, if they so wish, carry a badge and
a gun: two potent symbols of the US cop.
21 This is the first goal of the International Crime Control Strategy
published in 1998. At time of writing, August 2001, the ICCS (a
Clinton initiative) had yet to be adopted and endorsed by the Bush
Administration and informed opinion from a number of sources
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suggested that it was unlikely to be endorsed. Nevertheless, it is a
philosophy adopted vigorously by federal agencies. And it is a
founding philosophy much reinforced since 11 September 2001,
the events of which have blurred yet further the distinction in
perceptions between terrorism and transnational organised crime.
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